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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

SYMMETRY FOR SYMMETRY’S SAKE: WHY BOSE DOES
NOT REQUIRE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF A TRIAL COURT’S
FIRST AMENDMENT-FAVORABLE FINDINGS OF FACT
Joshua Wurtzel∗

Introduction
It was Nathaniel Friday’s job to secure an eagle for his tribe’s
annual religious ritual known as “Sun Dance.”1 Winslow Friday was his
cousin, and he endeavored to help Nathaniel however he could.2 The
Fridays had not yet acquired an eagle, and Winslow one day noticed a
bald eagle perched on a tree located on his reservation.3 Believing that
this was the eagle that God had provided for his family, Winslow shot
it, and the eagle’s tail was used on the offering pole of the 2005 Sun
Dance.4 Winslow never applied for a permit to take the eagle, as
required by federal law.5 The shooting was reported to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and Winslow was charged with violating the Eagle Act.6
Winslow moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground
that—as applied—the Eagle Act violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).7 The district court agreed and dismissed the
charges, finding that the government’s practical ban on eagle permits
available to those in Winslow’s position substantially burdened
∗ Business Manager, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (May 2013), Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude in Political Science, SUNY Binghamton (2010).
I would like to thank Professor Alexander A. Reinert as well as the editors of the Cardozo Law
Review de novo for their tireless commitment and insight. I would also like to thank my parents,
Gail and Elan, brother, Matthew, and fiancé, Amanda, for their unconditional support and love.
1 U.S. v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 945, 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
2 Id. at 945.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2006).
7 Friday, 525 F.3d at 945.
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Winslow’s religion and could not be justified by the government’s
interest in preserving the eagle population.8 Winslow Friday was spared
from prosecution.
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded to continue
the prosecution.9 That court found that the Eagle Act was permissible
under RFRA and rejected several of the district court’s factual findings
with regard to the government’s regulatory scheme.10 While noting that
judge-found facts in criminal cases are usually reviewed only for clear
error,11 the court of appeals examined the facts in the record and made
certain factual determinations for itself.12 The court relied on the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Bose Corporation v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc,13 to justify its authority to review the facts
in the record itself as opposed to using a clear error standard.
In Bose, a defamation case, the Supreme Court drastically
increased the power of appellate courts in First Amendment cases,
specifically authorizing those courts to conduct an “independent
review” of a trial court’s factual findings.14 Generally, appellate courts
may only reverse a trial court’s factual findings when those findings are
“clearly erroneous.”15 When the power of “independent review” is
employed, however, the appellate court is looking not only for factual
findings that are clearly erroneous, but also for those findings with
which it merely disagrees. An appellate court conducting an
independent review of a record has significantly greater ability to
reverse the trial court’s factual findings than a court employing the
clearly erroneous standard. This increased power is significant—
especially in First Amendment cases—since whether certain speech is
constitutionally protected often turns on seemingly minor factual
distinctions.16
8 U.S. v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 WL 3592952, at *5 (D. Wyo. Oct. 13, 2006) (“The
Court finds that the Government has failed to demonstrate that its policy of discouraging requests
for eagle take permits for Indian religious purposes, and limiting the issuance of such permits to
almost none, is the least restrictive means of advancing its stated interests in preserving eagle
populations and protecting Native American culture. This is particularly so when considering the
recent recovery of the species and that a more significant cause of eagle mortality is
electrocution.”).
9 Friday, 525 F.3d at 960.
10 Id. at 949.
11 Id.
12 See id. at 950.
13 466 U.S. 485 (1984). See Friday, 525 F.3d at 949-50. It must be noted that protections
under RFRA and the First Amendment are not exactly the same and that Friday involved a free
exercise claim, as opposed to a free speech claim like in Bose. Despite these important
differences, Friday is a prime example of the inequity in permitting appellate courts to secondguess a trial court’s factual findings where those findings were originally made in favor of a First
Amendment claimant.
14 466 U.S. at 513–14.
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
16 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 499-00 (1951) (upholding petitioners’ convictions for
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The Bose court employed this new standard of review, examining
the record for itself and independently making its own factual
determinations17—specifically with reference to the mental state of one
of the witnesses18—rather than deferring to the trial court’s factual
findings. The Court explained that this additional power of appellate
courts to make factual determinations—absent clear error—derived
from the First Amendment itself.19
In the wake of Bose, courts have struggled with the question of
whether the independent review rule in First Amendment cases is
limited only to factual determinations made by the trial court which
disparage a First Amendment claim, or whether an appellate court
always has a duty to independently examine the trial court’s factual
findings, regardless of which party prevailed below.20 This question has
been appropriately formulated as whether Bose is a “two-way street,”21
and the distinction is significant; conducting independent review where
the First Amendment claimant won below makes it much more difficult
for a claimant to have his First Amendment victory upheld on appeal.
Courts that conduct independent review of the trial court’s factual
determinations in all First Amendment cases, regardless of whether the
trial court upheld or rejected the First Amendment claim, reason that
“the [Bose] Court stated the rule of independent review in terms broad,
clear and without exception”22 and in furtherance of “symmetry” in the
law.23 In contrast, courts that reject such an approach and conduct
independent review only where the trial court rejected a First
Amendment claim invoke the purpose behind the Bose rule, specifically
violating the Smith Act and emphasizing the statute’s intent requirement).
17 See id. at 512 (noting that it was “not establish[ed] that [the author] realized the inaccuracy
[of his statement] at the time of publication”).
18 Bose, 466 U.S. at 491 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp.
1249, 1277 (D. Mass. 1981), rev’d, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984)).
19 “The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding concrete
cases; it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a deeply held
conviction that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise such review in
order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. The question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to
strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact.
Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the
record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is
not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’” Id. at 510-11.
20 See Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari and noting circuit split); U.S. v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950
(10th Cir. 2008) (conducting independent review despite the trial court’s dismissal of a criminal
information on First Amendment grounds, but noting that “the Bose opinion does not make clear
whether its more searching review . . . applies” in such a case).
21 See Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment Model of
Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1318 (1996).
22 Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985).
23 Friday, 525 F.3d at 950.
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“to assure ‘that the [trial court’s] judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion into the field of free expression.’”24
This Note argues that Bose does not support the symmetrical
application of independent review of facts by appellate courts in First
Amendment cases, regardless of whether the First Amendment claimant
won or lost below. While symmetrical procedures and results may be
desirable in most parts of the law, symmetry is not required where that
symmetry will inhibit a greater constitutional interest. In the
independent review context, symmetrical application of Bose results in
the reversal of First Amendment wins that would otherwise be upheld
under clear error review.25 This result is clearly antithetical to Bose’s
purpose of enhancing First Amendment protections.
A review of other areas of the law where asymmetry exists
indicates that Bose need not apply symmetrically, since the purpose of
the Bose rule is to protect First Amendment claims and not the
government’s interest in restricting free speech. This Note explores the
concept of symmetry in the law and argues that none of the purposes for
symmetry apply in the Bose context; applying Bose symmetrically for
the sake of symmetry actually inhibits the driving forces behind Bose.
Part I examines the origins of the independent review rule and the
purposes for which it was created, while also exploring the purposes
behind symmetry in the law. Part II analyzes the cases and scholarly
writing on each side of this issue and questions whether Bose’s
independent review rule actually expresses a preference for First
Amendment claims or simply a desire to ensure that First Amendment
cases are decided both legally and factually correct. Part II also
compares other asymmetries in the law and concludes that the interest in
protecting First Amendment freedoms—as exemplified in New York
Times Company v. Sullivan26 and Bose—outweighs any interest in
symmetry for symmetry’s sake. Part III proposes that Bose’s
independent review rule be used only when the First Amendment
claimant loses below. Part III reasons that the purposes behind the Bose
rule are actually inhibited by applying Bose regardless of which party
wins below and that the interest in symmetry present here is not an
interest which can justify greater restriction on free speech.

24 Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229
(7th Cir. 1985) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)); see also Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the independent review rule
“‘reflects a special solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by the First Amendment
have been unduly abridged,’ while not affording special protection ‘for the government’s claim
that it has been wrongly prevented from restricting speech’” (quoting Planned Parenthood
Ass’n/Chicago Area, 767 F.2d at 1229)).
25 See Friday, 525 F.3d at 949-50.
26 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2013

SYMMETRY FOR SYMMETRY’S SAKE

5

I. SYMMETRY AND THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW
A. Symmetry in the Law: A Worthy but Overvalued Goal
The notion that symmetry in the law is desirable is not a new
idea. Courts have historically sought to impose symmetry in various
contexts.27 Legal writers traditionally use the term “symmetry” to refer
to an implied function of the legal system, such as doing justice, staying
faithful to the purposes of other lawmakers, making the law coherent,
compensating for market imperfections, or providing justification for
conclusions.28
Perhaps the most basic reason for favoring symmetry in the law
is the belief that symmetry and fairness go hand-in-hand.29 The sting of
a seemingly “unfair” result or outcome may be lessened by noting that
the same “unfair” rule applies to everyone.30 Using symmetry as support
for the notion that a particular result is fair permits a commentator or
judge to justify a conclusion by characterizing it as embracing aspects
of another acceptable proposition in some satisfactory but indeterminate
way.31
The question arises, however, as to why treating like
circumstances alike necessarily makes the outcomes arrived at in those
circumstances correct. One answer is that drawing analogies and
treating similar circumstances alike yields consistency and uniformity in
the law.32 Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio33 is an
27 See Johnson v. State, 131 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Ark. 1939) (“[I]t is more important that the
law’s symmetry be preserved than it is that a criminal be punished in a particular case.”); Todd v.
Oviatt, 20 A. 440, 444 (Conn. 1889) (Pardee, J., dissenting) (arguing that the adoption of English
law may “mar the symmetry of our law” and emphasizing that “the preservation of symmetry in
our system I also view as a most important consideration”); State v. Pearson, 514 N.W.2d 452,
460 (Iowa 1994) (Snell, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “there is a symmetry in law that is
important to maintain” in arguing that the majority’s interpretation of “sexual contact” in an Iowa
statute rendered another, more specific statutory provision “purposeless”); State v. Fuller, 18 S.C.
246, 253 (1882) (noting that “[i]t is important to preserve the symmetry of the law” in holding
that preservation of such symmetry “requires that a county treasurer shall not pay any claim
against the county, except upon the check of the county commissioners, who are charged with the
duty of raising the money for that purpose and giving checks for all proper county claims”).
28 Karen Petroski, The Rhetoric of Symmetry, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2007).
29 See id. at 1188 (“Over time, opinion writers have come more often to present symmetry
and justice as correlated properties of the correct result without asserting a logical relation
between them. The concepts of symmetry and basic fairness remain strong rhetorical partners to
this day.”).
30 See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 551 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funds may not be used by challengers or
defenders of existing welfare reform law and emphasizing that “[t]he litigation ban is
symmetrical: [l]itigants challenging the covered statutes or regulations do not receive LSC
funding, and neither do litigants defending those laws against challenge”).
31 Petroski, supra note 28, at 1189.
32 See id. at 1197; id. at 1197 n.150 (compiling cases which adopt the notion that symmetrical
treatment of cases means treating like cases alike).
33 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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example of an instance in which symmetry was used to bring
consistency and uniformity to the law. Prior to Mapp, evidence illegally
obtained by federal officials was inadmissible in federal prosecutions,
but the same illegally obtained evidence could be admissible in state
prosecutions.34 In Mapp, Justice Douglas noted that “this is an
appropriate case in which to put an end to the asymmetry which Wolf
imported into the law.”35 To Justice Douglas, consistency and
uniformity were desirable objectives in and of themselves, and
symmetry in search and seizure law would lead to such results.36
Another justification for symmetry is that even where an outcome
is less than desirable, treating like cases and like parties alike is
generally fair.37 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas provides a nice example of this reasoning. Lawrence held invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause a Texas statute
criminalizing homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy.38 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor rejected the Court’s reliance on
due process and instead argued that the Texas law violated the Equal
Protection Clause.39 In Justice O’Connor’s view, it was unnecessary for
the Court to go further than requiring equality and symmetry in the law.
She reasoned that, where an intrusive law operates not only against a
limited class of individuals, but against society as a whole, the law will
likely be rejected through the democratic process.40 Thus, to Justice
O’Connor, the Court could fulfill its duty by requiring symmetry and
equality in the law, which would in turn push any other undesirable
effects of the law into the political process.
Many other courts and commentators, however, often allude to
symmetry as a desirable object without actually explaining why
symmetry is appropriate in a given circumstance.41 For example,
34
35
36

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
367 U.S. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See id. Legal commentators have also endorsed the virtues of consistency and uniformity.
For example, one commentator has proposed what she refers to as the “forced symmetry
approach” for adoption in abortion law, in which a symmetrical legal definition can be applied for
both the beginning and end of life. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective
of Death: An Introduction to the Forced Symmetry Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 42
(2006). In making her proposal, Professor Smolensky espouses “consistency and transparency” as
notable objectives and likely outcomes of her approach. Id. at 67 (“[T]he forced symmetry
approach encourages a holistic view of what it means to be alive within the eyes of the law,
meaning that a consistent use of the approach . . . ultimately may increase the consistency and
transparency of the law.”).
37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38 539 U.S. at 578.
39 Id. at 579.
40 Id. at 584–85 (“I am confident . . . that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a
sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals
alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic society.”).
41 See Petroski, supra note 28, at 1188 (“Like legal scholars, but for much longer, writers
responsible for making law have largely treated conceptions of symmetry as self-evident
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symmetry is often alluded to and used blindly to justify outcomes and
legal reasoning that would otherwise be without justification,42 or to
comfort those who might be uncomfortable with a particular decision,
as a reminder that the law or procedure at issue applies symmetrically is
thought to console those who might otherwise oppose the decision
being rendered. One instance of this use of symmetry as a justification
is the majority’s opinion in Hill v. Colorado,43 a case in which the
Supreme Court upheld restrictions on protesting in front of healthcare
facilities as proper time, place, and manner restrictions. In finding that
the Colorado statute at issue was content-neutral since the law did not
treat speakers differently based on the content of their messages, the
Court emphasized that “the statute applies equally to used car salesmen,
animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and
missionaries.”44 Thus, the law was not constitutionally objectionable, in
part, because it applied across the board to all types of speakers,
regardless of their identities or the content of their messages.45
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hill, however, challenged the
majority’s assumption that symmetry provided a saving grace for the
Colorado law. Indicating that the symmetry relied upon by the majority
was nothing more than superficial symmetry, Justice Scalia referenced
“Anatole France’s observation that ‘[t]he law, in its majestic equality,
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges.’”46
While symmetry serves important functions in the judicial
system, symmetry is just one of several interests to be considered in
arriving at an outcome.47 In the Bose context, symmetrical application
principles driving reasoning and guiding decision-making.”); id. at 1165 (“[A]lthough legal
writers virtually always use the term ‘symmetry’ as if its meaning were self-evident, in fact they
have used the same term to refer to a variety of distinct concepts, each with its own
ambiguities.”).
42 See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The unending
search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget about justice.”).
43 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
44 Id. at 723.
45 Id. at 725.
46 Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 550 (16th ed. 1992). Justice Scalia went on to argue that the Colorado law targeted
only abortion protestors and was thus not content-neutral. Id. at 744 (“This Colorado law is no
more targeted at used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and
missionaries than French vagrancy law was targeted at the rich. We know what the Colorado
legislators, by their careful selection of content (‘protest, education, and counseling’), were taking
aim at, for they set it forth in the statute itself: the ‘right to protest or counsel against certain
medical procedures’ on the sidewalks and streets surrounding health care facilities.”).
47 See, e.g., Jorhadl v. Berry, 75 N.W. 10, 11–12 (Minn. 1898) (holding that a default
judgment in an action by a physician against his patient to recover for professional services does
not bar an action by the patient against the physician for malpractice in the performance of such
services and emphasizing that “it is more important to work practical justice than to preserve the
logical symmetry of a rule, provided this can be done without destroying all rules, and leaving the
law on the subject all at sea”); Ross v. Cuthbert, 397 P.2d 529, 531 (Or. 1964) (“Symmetry in the
law or, termed otherwise, logical consistency is, of course, highly desirable; but of paramount
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of the independent review rule can be said to create uniform procedures
and ensure fairness for both sides. However, as the subsequent
examples demonstrate, symmetry need not be an absolute requirement,
and where other overriding interests are inhibited by a blind insistence
on symmetry, the question which must be raised is at what cost is
symmetry accomplished and whether that cost justifies a reliance on
symmetry. The symmetrical application of Bose as a two-way street
does further an interest in symmetry and uniformity, but at the cost of
less rigorous and under—rather than over—protection of First
Amendment freedoms. Since the Court’s driving concern in Bose was to
provide more painstaking protection of First Amendment rights,48 the
cost of symmetry in the Bose context is simply too great.
B. Independent Review Before Bose
Bose was not the first Supreme Court case to espouse the notion
of independent review of factual findings in constitutional cases. Even
before the Court’s watershed decision in Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme
Court hinted at its authority to make certain determinations that were
not necessarily conclusions of law for itself.49
The Supreme Court’s decision in Times v. Sullivan is most
famously known for the great change in First Amendment analysis it

importance is justice.”).
48 See infra notes 161–73 and accompanying text.
49 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“The state courts have held that
the petitioners’ conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law, and we may accept their
decision as binding upon us to that extent. But it nevertheless remains our duty in a case such as
this to make an independent examination of the whole record.”); Haynes v. State of Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 515–16 (1963) (“While, for purposes of review in this Court, the determination of
the trial judge or of the jury will ordinarily be taken to resolve evidentiary conflicts and may be
entitled to some weight even with respect to the ultimate conclusion on the crucial issue of
voluntariness, we cannot avoid our responsibilities by permitting ourselves to be completely
bound by state court determination of any issue essential to decision of a claim of federal right,
else federal law could be frustrated by distorted fact finding. . . . [W]hen, as in this case, the
question is properly raised as to whether a defendant has been denied the due process of law we
cannot be precluded by the verdict of a jury from determining whether the circumstances under
which the confession was made were such that its admission in evidence amounts to a denial of
due process.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Pennekamp v. State of Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (“The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to
determine the meaning and application of those words of that instrument which require
interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that responsibility, we are compelled to examine for
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see
whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and good
order of the courts or whether they are of a character which the principles of the First
Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.”
(footnote omitted)); Fiske v. State of Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385–86 (1927) (“[T]his Court will
review the finding of facts by a State court where a Federal right has been denied as the result of a
finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it; or where a conclusion of law as
to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to
pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts.”).
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produced, both in terms of its specific holding and its novel First
Amendment theory and analysis.50 A more subtle aspect of the majority
opinion in Times v. Sullivan,51 however, was the Court’s discussion of
independent review.52 After enunciating an actual malice requirement
for libel suits brought by public officials, the Court determined that it
was required to independently review the record to decide whether the
Constitution would permit a judgment for the plaintiff.53 The Court
concluded that its obligation was not limited to the explanation of
constitutional principles, but that it must also independently review the
evidence to ensure that constitutional principles were properly applied.54
Determining that the case required independent review, since the issue
involved the line between constitutionally protected free speech and
speech which may be regulated by the state,55 the Court then proceeded
to examine the facts of the case—specifically whether actual malice
existed and whether the statements in question were sufficiently
connected to the plaintiff.56
While independent review was not a novel concept at the time
Times v. Sullivan was decided,57 the Court’s use of independent review
in that case exceeded the bounds of its previous use. Specifically, the
Times v. Sullivan Court used independent review in an effort to avoid
the possibility that the Alabama state court on remand could retry the
defendants and impose liability under the Times v. Sullivan actual
malice standard itself.58 Despite the Court’s qualification that
considerations of effective judicial administration were what prompted
its exercise of independent review,59 the Court made clear that its
examination of the facts in a case like Times v. Sullivan was a
constitutional requirement.60
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Childress, supra note 20, at 1254.
Id.
See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–92 (1964).
Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 285.
Id.
See id. at 285–92 (finding that “there was no evidence whatever that [the individual
defendants] were aware of any erroneous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard”
and that “[a]s to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual
malice”).
57 See Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 896–97 (5th Cir.
1985).
58 Childress, supra note,20, at 1255 (“Despite the opinion’s references to earlier cases of
record reexamination, and its almost silky introduction of the authority by way of ‘efficient
judicial administration,’ the actual use was blunt and powerful, and fully intended to avoid the
prospect that Alabama could retry the defendants and find liability under the new constitutional
privilege because it was a qualified one.”).
59 Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–85.
60 Id. at 285 (“This Court’s duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles;
we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been
constitutionally applied.”); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
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C. Bose Enters the Fray
Two decades later, in 1984, the Supreme Court decided Bose,61 a
product disparagement suit arising out of a review written by Consumer
Reports in its May 1970 magazine issue.62 A small portion of the review
was dedicated to comments on the Bose 901 loudspeaker system,63
which was designed and marketed by Bose Corporation.64 The review
made some general remarks about the speaker system, commented on a
listener’s ability to pinpoint the exact location of instruments, and stated
that individual instruments heard through the Bose system “tended to
wander about the room.”65 The review then suggested that prospective
buyers hold off on purchasing the Bose 901 until they are sure they
would be satisfied with the system in the long-term.66
Bose Corporation objected to several statements in the article, but
Consumer Reports refused to issue a retraction, so Bose brought suit.67
The district court found that Bose Corporation was a public figure and
that to be successful it had to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Consumer Reports published its statements about the Bose 901 with
“knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of their truth
or falsity.”68
The district court, however, found that this burden was met with
regard to the article’s statement that instruments heard through the
speaker system tended to “wander about the room.”69 Based on the
testimony of the two Consumer Reports personnel primarily responsible
for the Bose 901 portion of the review, Arnold L. Seligson and Alan
Lefkow (collectively, “panelists”), the court concluded that the panelists
heard individual instruments wandering “along the wall,” not wandering
“about the room.”70 The court thus determined that the article’s
510–11 (1984) (“The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law.”).
61 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
62 Id. at 487.
63 Id. at 487–88.
64 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1251-52 (D.C. Mass.
1981), rev’d, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
65 466 U.S. at 488 (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, p. 274) (“Worse, individual instruments
heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander
about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from wall
to wall. With orchestral music, such effects seemed inconsequential. But we think they might
become annoying when listening to soloists.”).
66 Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, p. 275).
67 Id.
68 Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1274.
69 Id. at 1277.
70 Id. at 1266. This distinction was significant. At trial, the panelists testified “that the
wandering sounds that they heard were confined to an area within a few feet of the wall near
which the Bose 901 loudspeakers were placed.” Id. at 1267. The trial court noted that “a certain
degree of movement of the location of the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo
loudspeaker systems,” so “a reader would not be surprised to read about ‘instruments’ moving
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assertion that individual instruments tended to “wander about the room”
was false and disparaging.71
The district court went on to find that at the time of publication
Seligson knew that the words “tended to wander about the room” did
not accurately describe what he and Lefkow had observed when
conducting their listening test of the Bose 901 system.72 In reaching this
conclusion, the court considered Seligson’s testimony at trial that he did
not know exactly why he chose the word “about.”73 The court, however,
discredited that testimony and determined that Seligson knew the
difference between the terms “about the room” and “along the wall.”74
On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that Seligson knew this
statement in his review was false and that Bose had established actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.75
The First Circuit accepted the district court’s conclusion that the
review’s description of the sound “tend[ing] to wander about the room”
was fact, as opposed to an opinion, and that it was false.76 Yet,
determining that its review was not limited to the clearly erroneous
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), the court
proceeded to examine the statements in the Consumer Reports article
for itself.77 The court justified its independent examination of the record
by the need to ensure that the lower court properly applied the
controlling law and that the plaintiff had actually satisfied its burden of

along the wall between two loudspeakers.” Id. (emphasis added). The court, however, found that
“[m]ovement throughout the other areas of the room . . . is not to be expected,” and “that the
location of the movement of the apparent sound source is just as critical to a reader as the fact that
movement occurred.” Id. Thus, the court determined that the panelists actually heard instruments
moving “along the wall,” which would be expected and not out of the ordinary. Id. The review,
however, stated that instruments “tended to wander about the room,” which would constitute an
entirely different effect “contrary to what the average listener has become accustomed and would
probably be found objectionable by most listeners.” Id.
71 Id. at 1268.
72 Id. at 1277.
73 Id. at 1276–77.
74 Id. (“[A]ccording to Seligson, the words used in the Article ‘About the room’ mean
something different to him than they do to the populace in general. If Seligson is to be believed,
at the time of publication of the Article he interpreted, and he still interprets today, the words
‘about the room’ to mean ‘along the wall.’ After careful consideration of Seligson’s testimony
and of his demeanor at trial, the Court finds that Seligson’s testimony on this point is not credible.
Seligson is an intelligent person whose knowledge of the English language cannot be questioned.
It is simply impossible for the Court to believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as
‘about’ to mean anything other than its plain, ordinary meaning.”).
75 Id. at 1277.
76 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 194 (1st Cir. 1982), aff’d, 466
U.S. 485 (1984). That court further noted that Bose conceded that it was a public figure and that
the Times v. Sullivan standard applied. Id.
77 Id. at 195; FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).
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proof.78 The court did recognize, though, that questions of witness
credibility and demeanor were to be left to the trier of fact.79
Based on its own examination of the record, the First Circuit
determined that there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish
that the article’s authors published the statement that instruments tended
to wander about the room with knowledge that the statement was false
or with reckless disregard as to its falsity.80 The First Circuit
acknowledged that the authors’ used imprecise language in their review
but found that such imprecision did not support an inference of actual
malice.81
Shortly after the decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the First Circuit was required to apply the clearly
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a)(6).82 The Supreme Court upheld the
First Circuit’s independent review and concluded that it was not bound
by the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a)(6).83 The Court noted
that certain factual questions in particular areas of the law were too
important and had significant far-reaching effects, such that their
ultimate resolution should not be left in the hands of the trier of facts.84
Recognizing that First Amendment cases often turn on the specific
categorization of a particular statement, the Court acknowledged that it
previously used independent review to ensure the proper categorization
of speech and to properly confine the outer limits of any unprotected
category.85
In condoning the First Circuit’s use of independent review, the
Court proclaimed that Times v. Sullivan announced a rule of federal
constitutional law86 when it used independent appellate review.87 The
Court reasoned that the rule derived from “a deeply held conviction that
judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution.”88 The Court went on to afford particular
significance to questions of fact in defamation cases, noting that judges
must independently examine the record to determine whether the actual
78
79
80
81
82

692 F.2d at 195.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 493 (1984), aff’g, 692 F.2d

189.

83
84
85
86

Id. at 514.
Id. at 501 n.17.
Id. at 504-05.
See id. at 510-11. This is to be distinguished from a prudential or court-created rule which
may be amended or disregarded in different circumstances. By proclaiming that independent
review was a federal constitutional rule, the Court was essentially holding that the First
Amendment itself required independent review.
87 Id. at 510.
88 Id. at 510-511.
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malice standard is satisfied.89
The Court’s conclusion that Rule 52(a)(6) did not govern review
of an actual malice determination under Times v. Sullivan and that, in
such a case, an appellate court “must” use its “independent judgment”
to determine whether the actual malice standard has been met,90 was
limited by its refusal to require unbridled review of the facts in actual
malice cases. Specifically, the Court cautioned that independent review
should only be applied to those parts of the record which relate to the
actual malice determination and should not amount to a de novo review
of the ultimate judgment itself.91
Justice White filed a short dissent, disagreeing with the majority
on its standard of review.92 Justice Rehnquist also wrote a dissent,
which Justice O’Connor joined, taking issue with the majority’s rule of
independent review and contending that appellate judges’ factual
determinations will be no more reliable than those of trial judges.93
Whether intentional or not, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent relied on an
interpretation of the purpose of the Court’s holding to be “greater
protection for First Amendment values,” as opposed to more accurate
results regardless of the winner.94
D. Questions After Bose
Despite the Bose court’s efforts to limit the use of independent
review, many questions arose in the wake of Bose regarding the scope
89 Id. (“The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the
convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a
question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the
entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
90 Id. at 514.
91 Id. at 514 n.31 (“There are, of course, many findings of fact in a defamation case that are
irrelevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and to which the
clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable. Indeed, it is not actually necessary to
review the ‘entire’ record to fulfill the function of independent appellate review on the actualmalice question; rather, only those portions of the record which relate to the actual-malice
determination must be independently assessed. The independent review function is not equivalent
to a ‘de novo’ review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an
original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should be
entered for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines that actual malice has been established
with convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial court may only be reversed on the ground of
some other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated
that it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that the Court of Appeals did not overturn any
factual finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, but instead engaged in an independent
assessment only of the evidence germane to the actual-malice determination.”).
92 Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (“I believe that the primary result of the Court’s holding today will not be greater
protection for First Amendment values, but rather only lessened confidence in the judgments of
lower courts and more entirely fact-bound appeals.” (emphasis added)).
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of its rule. While the Court noted that Bose’s independent review was
different from de novo review of a lower court’s ultimate judgment,95 it
was unclear whether the evaluation of underlying facts and the drawing
of inferences fell within the scope of the Court’s independent review
rule.
It was also unclear whether Bose applied in all First Amendment
cases or just those involving an actual malice determination. The
Court’s language suggests that perhaps only actual malice
determinations fall under the Bose rule,96 but its logic arguably applies
in other First Amendment contexts.97 Even if it is assumed that Bose
applies beyond actual malice determinations, the question remains open
of the other types of cases in which it applies. Bose may not be limited
to just actual malice determinations, but may be said to extend only to
other defamation cases.98 If Bose extends further, however, it is unclear
whether it would be limited to just free speech cases or any type of First
95
96

Id. at 514 n.31.
See id. at 514 (“We hold that the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a
determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Appellate
judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record
establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
97 Id. at 510–11 (“[Independent review] reflects a deeply held conviction that judges—and
particularly Members of this Court—must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious
liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the
record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact.”). The Court went on to tie
this statement in with the actual malice standard, id. at 511 (“Judges, as expositors of the
Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross
the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of actual malice.”), but it is difficult to see a reasoned distinction between
instances where actual malice is the burden which must be overcome and defamation cases that
require only a showing of negligence. In fact, speech is already protected to a greater degree with
the actual malice standard, and independent review—as used in Bose—will only strengthen that
protection. Defamation cases requiring only a showing of negligence already receive weakened
First Amendment protection by virtue of the significantly lesser burden on the plaintiff. To refuse
to apply independent review to these cases further weakens the protection of speech in such
instances as compared to actual malice cases. It can be argued that cases involving the actual
malice standard involve speech requiring greater protection than those cases involving a mere
negligence standard, but this distinction is not obvious from the Court’s holding, and nothing in
Bose purports to make such a claim. There might, however, be an argument that, unlike the
question of whether a party knew something at the time he or she uttered or wrote a statement,
whether that party was negligent is a question of law, not fact. See id. at 515 (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “reckless disregard” component of actual malice is not a question of
fact). Accepting such an argument, it might not even be necessary to determine whether Bose was
meant to apply to negligence cases, since whether someone was negligent is usually a question of
law. This assumption does not end the debate, though, since, if Bose is applied to underlying facts
and the drawing of inferences, then there might be other factual issues contributing to a
negligence determination apart from that determination itself which could be independently
reviewed. If such is to be the application of Bose, then it is difficult to see why underlying facts
and inferences should be treated differently depending on the plaintiff’s burden of proof.
98 See supra, note 97.
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Amendment challenges.99
Finally, Bose raised the question of whether it is to be applied
even if the First Amendment claim prevailed below.100 Applying
independent review where a First Amendment claim is upheld below
makes it easier for an appellate court to reverse and deny the claim, thus
weakening protection for the claim. Some courts and commentators,
however, have insisted on maintaining symmetry in the law and
conducting independent review in First Amendment cases regardless of
which party prevailed below.101
II. WHY SYMMETRY AND BOSE DO NOT GO HAND-IN-HAND
While the law has an interest in creating symmetrical procedures
and outcomes, this interest must yield to other legal goals and concerns
in certain circumstances. Various asymmetries exist in the law to further
other important legal interests, thus demonstrating that symmetry for
symmetry’s sake is not necessary where other important interests are at
stake.
A. Asymmetry in Summary Judgment Proceedings
The Supreme Court has expressly endorsed a procedural
asymmetry in civil litigation. In Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, the
Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Rule 56(c),102 a party moving for
summary judgment may show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law simply by showing that the nonmoving party failed to make a
sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of its case
and on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial.103 Under
Celotex, the movant is merely required to inform the district court of the
basis of its motion and identify those parts of the record which reveal
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.104 The nonmoving party,
however, is not required to support its motion with evidence refuting the
movant’s claims if it lacks the burden of proof on the particular issue at
hand.105
Some commentators have described the Court’s approach in
99 See U.S. v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (conducting independent review in a
challenge brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)).
100 See Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (White, J., noting
split in the circuits over this issue and dissenting from denial of certiorari).
101 See Friday, 525 F.3d at 950 (“Although we have never explained why, this Circuit has
applied Bose even when First Amendment claims prevailed below, and thus taken the side of
symmetry.”); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2441–43 (1998) (endorsing the symmetrical
application of Bose).
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
103 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
104 Id. at 323.
105 Id.
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Celotex as creating an asymmetrical system under which defendants are
heavily favored and a significant burden is placed on plaintiffs to
produce documentary evidence, yet no similar burden is placed on the
defendant.106 This asymmetry enables a defendant—without producing
any affidavits or evidence of its own—to force a plaintiff to produce
extraneous evidence or else risk summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. The Celotex approach arguably dispenses with a defendant’s
“price of admission” for filing a summary judgment motion, since the
output cost of filing a summary judgment motion is significantly
diminished for defendants as compared to plaintiffs.107 Even where a
nonmovant plaintiff prevails, that party will nonetheless have expended
substantial resources and effort, as well as given the defendant a very
clear bird’s eye view of its case with very little effort.108
Despite the asymmetry created by the approach set forth in
Celotex, the Court found that this asymmetry was justified, because the
Celotex approach furthered one of the fundamental purposes of
summary judgment: “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses.”109 The Court noted that summary judgment is not a
procedural shortcut but an essential aspect of the Federal Rules as a
whole, “which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’”110 The Court further stated that Rule 56
must be construed so as to have “due regard” for those parties
challenging a plaintiff’s claim (or a defendant’s defense) which has no
factual basis.111 Therefore, the Court implicitly accepted the asymmetry
it had to have known its new approach would yield in an effort to
106 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 82 n.49 (1990); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the CounterRevolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 39 (1988) (arguing that Celotex “has introduced a procedure which is
asymmetrical, grossly favoring defendants over plaintiffs no matter which party is the movant”);
R. Bruce Beckner, Advance Sheet, 24 LITIGATION, 63, 64–65 (Spring 1998).
107 Risinger, supra note 106, at 38–39 (“Although current Rule 56 is hardly clear in
unbundling the two steps, it appears to contemplate a process in which the moving party, whether
plaintiff or defendant, bears the burden of drawing from the various materials available to the
parties but not yet available to the judge, and of presenting them in such a way as to make a
convincing showing that the record can be confidently predicted in its relevant dimensions at that
time. This is the movant’s ‘price of admission,’ and only if the movant is willing to pay that price,
with all the drudgery it entails in any fairly complex file, should the opponent be put to the
burden of formulating a response. The Supreme Court seems to have been numb to these ‘price of
admission’ functions, particularly in Celotex, and as a result has introduced a procedure which is
asymmetrical, grossly favoring defendants over plaintiffs no matter which party is the movant.”
(footnote omitted)).
108 Id. at 41–42.
109 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).
110 Id. at 327.
111 Id. (“Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting
claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the
manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.”).
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further the purposes of the summary judgment process and the Federal
Rules in general.
With its decision to adopt an asymmetrical approach with respect
to summary judgment, the Court demonstrated that symmetry may yield
to greater fundamental interests. By justifying its holding in Celotex on
the ground that the summary judgment process should further one of the
“primary purposes” of summary judgment in “isolat[ing] and
dispos[ing] of factually unsupported claims or defenses,”112 the Court
displayed a willingness to raise the procedural and practical burdens of
one party as compared to another in an effort to promote the interest in
the orderly administration of justice and protection for parties
challenging claims or defenses lacking a factual basis.
The Court’s attitude in Celotex can be seen to display a preference
for over-enforcement of minimum requirements to get to a jury as
compared to under-enforcement, which would make summary judgment
more difficult for a defendant and permit more claims to be heard by a
jury.113 This attitude and apparent preference for over-protection of
defendants, as opposed to under-protection, is similar to the attitude
displayed in Bose of preferring over-protection of First Amendment
rights at the expense of the most legally correct outcomes.114 To be sure
that challenged speech “actually falls within the unprotected category”
and in an effort “to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category
within acceptably narrow limits . . . to ensure that protected expression
will not be inhibited,”115 Bose crafted a rule which expressed a clear
preference for over-protection of First Amendment rights rather than
under-protection. The driving purpose behind the independent review
rule in Bose was “to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution.”116 Just like the Court in Celotex advanced
an asymmetrical procedural approach to further the purposes behind
summary judgment, the Court in Bose can be seen to have adopted an
asymmetrical rule—Bose as a one-way street—to further the
constitutional interests in over-protection of First Amendment rights.
Therefore, symmetry need not exist solely for its own sake but may
yield to other pressing fundamental interests.
The interests protected by the Celotex rule arguably extend beyond
112
113

Id. at 323–24.
Risinger, supra note 106, at 42 (“Over time, defendants can be expected to become better
at making thinner and thinner ‘put the plaintiff to his proof about his proof’ motions. This,
coupled with the perceived exhortation for more summary judgments, is bound to lead to many
summary judgments improvidently granted in favor of defendants, not because judges do not
understand directed verdict sufficiency law (as well as it can be understood), but because they
have mispredicted what the record would have been at trial.”).
114 See infra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.
115 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984).
116 Id. at 511.
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the procedural realm and implicate substantive interests. Similarly, Bose
can be seen as setting forth more than abstract procedural requirements.
Bose is not just about standard of review, but about vigorous
enforcement of First Amendment rights, and a tendency to prefer overenforcement to under-enforcement. Seen in this context, Bose can then
be seen as a one-way street—despite the asymmetry of such an
application—just like the asymmetries created in other areas of the law
where substantive fundamental rights are at stake.
B. Asymmetry and Double Jeopardy
Often in criminal law, courts struggle with the balance between
protecting individual rights and maintaining an orderly and symmetrical
system of justice. While Bose and much of First Amendment law differs
drastically from the criminal law, the ways in which courts have
struggled to incorporate both symmetry and protection of liberty in
criminal cases provides a clear understanding of the way these two
interests have been balanced. While the issues that arise in the criminal
law context are quite different from those involved in most First
Amendment cases, an examination of symmetry’s role in criminal cases
where constitutional values are at stake—just like in Bose—provides
insight into how symmetry and constitutional rights have been balanced.
One striking example of the interplay between symmetry and the
protection of fundamental rights occurs in the context of double
jeopardy and whether the prosecution may appeal and retry a defendant
after a criminal trial. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause117 and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment118
have been interpreted to prohibit the prosecution in a state criminal case
from appealing legal error after trial and retrying a defendant.119 In
initially refusing to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court reasoned in Palko v. Connecticut that, since a defendant may
appeal from his conviction, it would not be absurd to permit the
prosecution to similarly appeal errors of law and retry a defendant based
upon such errors.120 The Court justified such an outcome by stating that,
with such a result, “[t]he edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, to
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”).
118 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb”).
119 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to the
States).
120 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), overruled by Benton, 395 U.S. at 794 (“If the trial had been
infected with error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his instance, and as
often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege, subject at all times to the
discretion of the presiding judge, has now been granted to the state.” (internal citation omitted)).
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many, greater than before.”121 The Palko Court based its conclusion that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to the States, thus allowing
the prosecution to appeal errors of law and retry a defendant in a state
criminal prosecution, in part, on notions of maintaining symmetrical
procedures for both parties to an adversarial contest.
This symmetrical application of the law was rejected, however,
thirty-two years later in favor of applying the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the States, on the reasoning that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment represents a “fundamental
ideal in our constitutional heritage.”122 In its decision overruling Palko,
the Benton Court did not once address Palko’s reliance on symmetrical
procedures for a defendant and the prosecution alike. Instead, the Court
found that, once a particular provision in the Bill of Rights is deemed to
be fundamental, it must be applied against the States.123 Thus, the
Benton Court implicitly observed that any interest in symmetry is
outweighed where a “fundamental ideal in our constitutional
heritage”124 is in play.
It must, however, be acknowledged that the Benton-Palko
interplay provides limited support for the notion that symmetry need not
control where a constitutional right is at issue. Benton was not focused
on the ability of a State to appeal but on a State’s power to retry a
defendant.125 Benton was about whether to incorporate the Double
Jeopardy Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.126 Yet, Benton expressly overruled Palko,127 and Palko
made clear that it was not deciding whether the State may be “permitted
after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to bring
another case against him.”128 Therefore, Benton must at least be seen as
standing for the proposition that, even if errors of law were made at trial
121
122
123

Id. (emphasis added).
Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
Id. at 795 (“Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic
constitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the circumstances does
not disclose a denial of fundamental fairness. Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights
guarantee is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal Governments.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
124 Id. at 794.
125 See 392 U.S. 925, 925–26 (1968) (granting certiorari to determine whether “the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment [is] applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment” and whether “the petitioner [was] twice put in jeopardy in this case” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
126 See 395 U.S. at 793–96. Arguably, Benton can be seen as nothing more than a decision
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause symmetrically—as against both the federal government and
the States. Since freedom from double jeopardy is an explicit constitutional requirement—thus
mandating asymmetry—Benton arguably did nothing more than apply this constitutionally
required asymmetry in a symmetrical manner.
127 Id. at 794.
128 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (emphasis added).
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which tended to favor the defendant, the State is not permitted to retry
that defendant even if an appellate court agrees that such errors were
committed. While Benton is certainly about incorporating the right to be
free from retrial, it is effectively a bar on appeals conducted by the
State.
In part because of the symmetry afforded by a system which
permits effective appeals (and retrial) by both the defendant and the
prosecution, Palko found that the right to be free from double jeopardy
was not one of the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”129 In overruling
Palko, the Benton Court therefore rejected this reasoning as a ground
for failing to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause against the States. To
put it another way, Benton found that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
represent “a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage”130 despite
the virtues of a more symmetrical approach. While the Fifth
Amendment itself mandates this asymmetry, the Court decided that this
asymmetry was required even in State prosecutions and implicitly
rejected Palko’s symmetry rationale for why this federally required
asymmetry should not extend to the States. Thus, the important point
here is not that the Fifth Amendment itself mandates this asymmetrical
procedure, but that the Benton Court itself made the decision that
symmetry could not justify a failure to incorporate a “fundamental
ideal”131 against the States.
C. Why Benton Demonstrates that Bose Need Not Be Applied
Symmetrically
Bose’s constitutional command that appellate courts conduct
independent review in First Amendment cases is not dissimilar from the
notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the prosecution from appealing errors of law and retrying a
defendant in a criminal trial. After all, the First Amendment’s
prohibition on the abridgement of free speech has also been found to be
a personal right protected by the Due Process Clause from State
infringement.132 Therefore, since Benton rejected any symmetry
justification for refusing to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to the
States, it follows that a mere interest in symmetrical procedures based
on which party prevailed below should not be enough to outweigh the
129
130
131
132

Id.
395 U.S. at 794.
Id.
Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to the States and holding that the Free Speech Clause is
“among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
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interest in properly applying “fundamental personal rights,” such as
freedom of speech.133 Benton stands for the notion that symmetry alone
is not enough to justify refusing to extend a fundamental right to the
States, thus providing for greater enforcement of constitutional
concerns. Viewing Bose as a means of vigorously protecting First
Amendment rights, any interest in symmetry should similarly not trump
forceful enforcement of these rights.
The question of whether Bose is a two-way street is not a matter
of whether independent review itself should be applied against the
States, but a question of whether an interest in symmetry is sufficient to
outweigh an interest in more stringent protection of First Amendment
rights. The governing principle, however, remains the same: where the
protection of a fundamental right will be hindered by imposing
symmetrical procedures in the law, any interest in symmetry need not
control for symmetry’s sake alone.134 Benton implicitly provides
support for this principle, and none of the purposes behind requiring
symmetry in the first place demand that it be applied in the Bose
context.135 Only if a greater reason for symmetry exists in the
independent review context than in the context of appeals from criminal
trials should symmetry and evenhandedness counsel in favor of
lessening protection for free speech. Double jeopardy applies to
criminal prosecutions, and lessening double jeopardy protections for
criminal defendants may result in loss of life, liberty, or property. On
the other hand, Bose involved a libel suit in which the defendant stood
to lose only money, and it is possible that the consequences of
weakening First Amendment protection may be less severe than the
consequences of weakening double jeopardy protection. However,
courts interpreting Bose to require symmetrical application regardless of
which party prevails below have not limited such application to civil
suits,136 and First Amendment freedoms have been vigorously protected
even where an adverse First Amendment finding would not result in
133
134

See id.
Benton and Palko involved competing interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and did not directly address the issue of whether symmetry at the expense
of a fundamental right could ever be appropriate. In Palko, however, the Court concluded that the
right to be free from multiple prosecutions when the first prosecution contained errors of law is
not one of the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.” 302 U.S. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Palko did not
address any competition between fundamental rights and symmetrical procedures, because the
Court concluded that no fundamental right was at stake. In Benton, however, the Court held that
double jeopardy protection was a “fundamental ideal,” 395 U.S. at 794, and the Court went on to
implicitly reject any contention that an interest in symmetrical procedures could outweigh an
individual defendant’s constitutional right to be free from multiple prosecutions.
135 See infra Part II.D.
136 See U.S. v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (conducting independent review of
trial court’s factual findings where trial court dismissed information charging defendant with
violating Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act on First Amendment grounds).
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imprisonment.137 Thus, utilizing less protective measures in First
Amendment independent review cases would not necessarily yield
consequences so much less severe than the consequences of failing to
protect criminal defendants from being subjected to multiple
prosecutions for the same offense.
If anything, the interest in symmetry in both the double jeopardy
and the independent review contexts is quite similar. Palko reasoned
that “[a] reciprocal privilege” to appeal errors of law is not
unreasonable, since the State has an interest in “a trial free from the
corrosion of substantial legal error.”138 Likewise, conducting
independent review of a trial court’s factual findings even when the trial
court upheld a First Amendment claim would likely benefit the
accuracy and reliability of the proceedings as a whole, since factual
determinations would be independently examined twice, as opposed to
just once. Benton, however, stands for the proposition that the accuracy
and reliability of judicial proceedings may, in certain circumstances,
yield to the protection of fundamental rights.139 Similarly, while
conducting symmetrical independent review in First Amendment cases
may lead to more accurate and reliable results, such accuracy and
reliability need not come at the price of lessening First Amendment
protection.140 For example, in Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benevolent and
Protective Association, where the Fifth Circuit conducted independent
review of the trial court’s factual determination that actual malice had
not been proved, the court concluded that the operation of independent
review does not necessarily work only to further free speech rights.141
This determination of the driving purpose behind Bose’s independent
review rule is inconsistent with specific language in Bose. The Bose
Court noted that it previously conducted an independent examination of

137 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138 302 U.S. at 328.
139 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
140 The adversarial nature of the American judicial system supports the notion that trials are
not proceedings aimed solely at the ascertainment of truth. For example, evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments may not be admitted against a state criminal
defendant at trial, even where that evidence clearly establishes a defendant’s guilt. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases to the
States). If the sole objective of a trial was to discover the truth, then excluding concededly
relevant yet illegally obtained evidence would seem to hinder that goal. Thus, an interest in
accurate results—while a very strong interest indeed—does not necessarily trump an interest in
protecting fundamental rights.
141 Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“First, it is not clear to us that the rationale of Bose is inapplicable here, for definition of First
Amendment protections requires inclusion as well as exclusion and the former is no less a judicial
function merely because it does not pose a direct threat to First Amendment values. Including
speech within the protected category requires no less careful an evaluation of constitutionally
significant facts than excluding such speech.”).
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the record to make sure that protected speech will not be infringed
upon.142 The Court further stated that the independent review rule is one
of federal constitutional law and thus “reflects a deeply held conviction
that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise
such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution.”143
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in his Bose dissent
that the majority’s goal was to protect free speech. He wrote that “the
primary result of the Court’s holding today will not be greater
protection for First Amendment values, but rather only lessened
confidence in the judgments of lower courts and more entirely factbound appeals.”144 The Bose Court gave every indication that the rule of
independent review was meant to protect First Amendment rights, and
there is no suggestion that independent review was designed solely to
come to more accurate or reliable results at the expense of First
Amendment freedoms.145 Because Bose’s independent review rule
protects First Amendment values and not merely the accuracy of results
in First Amendment cases, the furtherance and vigorous protection of
First Amendment values is a greater constitutional interest than
symmetry for symmetry’s sake.
D. The Purpose Behind the Independent Review Rule is to Further
Enhance—Not Diminish—First Amendment Protections
An examination of the purposes behind the Bose rule itself reveals
that treating Bose as a two-way street inhibits the purpose and spirit
behind the independent review rule in First Amendment cases. Any
justification of Bose as a two-way street relies on a desire to have
symmetrical procedures and appellate review standards regardless of
which party wins below. This interest in symmetry, however, like in the
criminal context, is overcome by reference to Bose’s origin, purpose,
and spirit.
Some courts that have found Bose to be a two-way street have
been unable to justify their decisions with reference to any goal or
142
143
144
145

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984).
Id. at 510–11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988) (“This rule ‘reflects
a special solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by the First Amendment have been
unduly abridged,’ while not affording special protection ‘for the government’s claim that it has
been wrongly prevented from restricting speech.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago
Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1985))); Planned Parenthood
Ass’n/Chicago Area, 767 F.2d at 1229) (“The rule’s purpose is to assure ‘that the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion into the field of free expression.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964))); Childress, supra note 20, at 1322 (“[I]t should be
recognized that the free review rule is about appealing censorship, not enabling appellate
censorship.”).
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purpose other than mere symmetry.146 Other courts have summarily
stated that independent review applies.147 Still, some courts and
commentators have provided alternate justifications apart from
symmetry for the application of Bose as a two-way street, and these
alternate justifications require some attention.
First, some courts have argued in favor of Bose as a two-way
street on the ground that Bose itself did not expressly limit its
independent review rule to cases in which the First Amendment
claimant lost below.148 Even Justice O’Connor, during oral argument for
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,149 implied that limiting Bose’s
application only to adverse First Amendment factual findings would be
an extension of Bose and not derived from Bose’s explicit enunciation
of the independent review rule.150 Specifically, in response to the
defense attorney’s assertion that Bose was a one-way street, Justice
O’Connor replied, “I don’t think Bose spelled it out that way. I don’t
read that necessarily into Bose. So you may be asking us to move on to
another step beyond that case.”151
Looking at the Court’s opinion in Bose as a whole, however,
demonstrates the rule’s purpose so clearly that the Court likely felt it
unnecessary to expressly note such a limitation. The Bose Court stated
that, in First Amendment cases, the Court has routinely conducted an
independent examination of the record both to ensure that “the speech in
question actually falls within the unprotected category” and to confine
the limits of that unprotected category “in an effort to ensure that
protected expression will not be inhibited.”152 The former presupposes a
lower court judgment that certain speech is not protected, and the latter
demonstrates the Court’s concern with ensuring that speech will not be
unduly abridged by overly broad categories of unprotected speech.
Thus, both justifications for independent review, as set forth by the Bose
majority, indicate that the rule is aimed at protecting—not restricting—
free speech.
The Bose Court goes on to comment that the rule of independent
146 See U.S. v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the circuit split but stating
that, “[a]lthough we have never explained why, this Circuit has applied Bose even when First
Amendment claims prevailed below, and thus taken the side of symmetry.”).
147 See Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n deciding
whether restrictions on speech are justified, appellate courts do not rely heavily on findings of
fact made by trial courts.”).
148 See Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“As regards the review of actual malice determinations, the Court stated the rule of independent
review in terms broad, clear and without exception. . . . We think if the Court had intended to
make such a distinction it would have so limited its holding.”).
149 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
150 Childress, supra note 20, at 1319-20 (1996) (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 12.09[3] n.365 (1991)).
151 Id. (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12.09[3] n.365 (1991)).
152 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984).
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review—a rule which the Court says is one of federal constitutional
law—reflects the belief of judges and Supreme Court justices that
independent review must be exercised to protect the freedoms
established by the Constitution.153 Any application of Bose to reverse
First Amendment-favorable judgments would not work to “preserve the
precious liberties”154 of the First Amendment and would make it
more—not less—difficult for First Amendment claimants to prevail on
appellate review.
Even Justice Rehnquist’s Bose dissent acknowledged that the
purpose of the Court’s rule was to protect the First Amendment.155
While he disagreed with the majority over whether independent review
would in fact result in greater First Amendment protection, he did not
take issue with such as being the central premise of the majority’s
holding.156
As for Justice O’Connor’s157 remarks during oral argument of
153 Id. at 510–11 (“The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of
deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a
deeply held conviction that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution.
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity
required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment
that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
154 Id. at 511.
155 Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156 Id. Other lower courts interpreting Bose have agreed that the purpose behind the rule is to
promote the interest in First Amendment protections, thus requiring independent review only
when such would further—and not infringe upon—First Amendment interests. See, e.g., Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago
Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he presence of a First
Amendment issue in a case does not, in and of itself, trigger the rule of independent review of the
factual findings of the lower court. The rule’s purpose is to assure ‘that the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion into the field of free expression.’ . . . The rule thus reflects a
special solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by the First Amendment have been
unduly abridged. . . . The doctrine of independent review has never been thought to afford special
protection for the government’s claim that it has been wrongly prevented from restricting
speech.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964))); see also Childress,
supra note 20, at 1322 (1996) (“[I]t should be recognized that the free review rule is about
appealing censorship, not enabling appellate censorship.”); Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the
Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 76–77 (1985) (“So
viewed, the procedural balance that effectuates the actual malice concept provides that neither
judge nor jury shall possess absolute discretion to punish expression in the defamation context.”).
157 Justice Rehnquist had initially raised the issue at oral argument, directly asking Hustler
Magazine’s lawyer whether he believed Bose was a “one-way street.” Childress, supra note 20, at
1319 (1996) (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12.09[3] n.365 (1991)). It
would be difficult to see how Justice Rehnquist could—consistent with his dissent in Bose—
advocate for a system in which independent review would occur in more, rather than less,
instances. Justice Rehnquist’s Bose dissent took issue with the reliability of factual
determinations made by appellate judges. See 466 U.S. at 520 ((“[I]t is not clear to me that the de
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Hustler Magazine, it cannot be said that her views, even if we assume
that she firmly believed Bose to be a two-way street, were
representative of a majority of the Court. During oral argument of
Hustler Magazine, Hustler’s lawyer firmly insisted that independent
review applies only to factual findings which are adverse to a First
Amendment claimant. He also argued that the purpose of the
independent review rule was to “protect the speaker,” thus triggering
Bose only in instances where the speaker actually needs protection.158
Yet, the majority opinion did not address the question of Bose’s reach
proposed by Hustler’s attorney; instead, the majority simply accepted
the jury’s factual findings of whether the ad at issue in the case would
be interpreted as factual.159 At least one commentator has argued that
this acceptance of the jury’s factual findings—after the dialogue at oral
argument on the issue of Bose’s reach—might provide implicit support
for the notion that Bose really is just a one-way street.160
Another justification for applying Bose symmetrically is that
independent review can serve the function of protecting the First
Amendment even when it works to exclude certain speech from
protected categories.161 The argument goes that properly defining the
parameters of protected speech is an important judicial function under
Bose, even when First Amendment values are not directly at stake.162
This rationale, however, presupposes that Bose stands for the
novo findings of appellate courts, with only bare records before them, are likely to be any more
reliable than the findings reached by trial judges.”). For him to be in favor of expanded
independent review would seem inconsistent with his casual assumption in Bose that such review
is not necessarily more reliable than the factual determinations made by trial court judges. Unless
Justice Rehnquist was implying that he would find Bose to be a two-way street to ensure a system
of symmetry in unreliable factual findings, then this single offhand question should not be viewed
as dispositive of his views on the issue.
158 Childress, supra note 20, at 1319 (1996) (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 12.09[3] n.365 (1991)).
159 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (“The Court of Appeals
interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody ‘was not reasonably believable,’ and in
accordance with our custom we accept this finding.” (internal citation omitted)). It should be
noted that Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Hustler Magazine.
160 Childress, supra note 20, at 1320 (1996) (“The result [in Hustler Magazine] may give some
support to arguing that the Court implicitly found in favor of a one-way street.”).
161 See Bartimo v. Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985).
162 See id. (“[I]t is not clear to us that the rationale of Bose is inapplicable here, for definition
of First Amendment protections requires inclusion as well as exclusion and the former is no less a
judicial function merely because it does not pose a direct threat to First Amendment values.
Including speech within the protected category requires no less careful an evaluation of
constitutionally significant facts than excluding such speech.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1027
(1996) (arguing that, for purposes of the “hostile environment” question in workplace harassment
suits, “independent judgment review . . . is generally both valuable and permissible under Rule
52(a) and the Seventh Amendment, whether or not the free speech claimant lost at trial,” because
“[i]n either situation, appellate independent judgment should generally produce more refinement
of the hostile environment standard”).
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proposition that First Amendment cases are too important to get
wrong—regardless of who wins—as opposed to the principle that First
Amendment rights are too important to infringe. If the former were true,
then reliability and accuracy would be controlling interests, even at the
cost of under-protection of First Amendment rights. If, however, the
latter is true, then it is the vigorous protection of First Amendment
rights which drives independent review, and over-protection of speech
is more highly valued than proper resolution of First Amendment cases.
Given the complete absence of any language in Bose indicating that the
driving principle behind its rule was to ensure more accurate First
Amendment results and the heavy emphasis on “preserv[ing] the
precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution,”163 this
interpretation of Bose makes little sense.164
Finally, one court noted that treating Bose as a one-way street
could lead to the same record being evaluated under different standards
as it makes its way through the appellate review process.165 This
potential problem, however, is more theoretical than real. Assuming that
Bose is a one-way street, a First Amendment claimant who loses at the
trial level would be entitled to have an intermediate appellate court
independently examine the relevant facts of his case. If this claimant
were to prevail and the party arguing for a restriction of First
Amendment rights, usually the government or a defamation plaintiff,
also known as the “restricting party”, were to appeal to a higher court,
that court would not conduct independent review, since the First
Amendment claimant prevailed below. This would not be any less fair
to the restricting party than if it had lost at trial, since that party was
never entitled to independent review, and the Bose rule served its
purpose by over-protecting free speech. Neither should different
standards of review at different levels in the appellate process create
problems, since higher appellate courts are often not permitted to
conduct factual reviews even though an intermediate appellate court
may.166
If, still assuming Bose is a one-way street, the First Amendment
claimant prevails at the trial level, but loses at the intermediate appellate
level despite the absence of any independent review by the intermediate
163
164
165

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984).
See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text.
See Bartimo, 771 F.2d at 898 n.3 (“[Defendant’s] argument would introduce the possibility
of a particular record being reviewed by two different standards as it made its way through the
appellate process. . . . We think judicial economy is best served by requiring the same standard of
review at all levels, regardless of the outcome below.”).
166 Compare N.Y. C.P.L. § 470.15(5) (1970) (granting New York intermediate appellate
courts authority to reverse or modify a criminal judgment where the “judgment was, in whole or
in part, against the weight of the evidence”), with N.Y. C.P.L. § 470.35 (1970) (granting the New
York Court of Appeals no authority to weigh the evidence).
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appellate court, the First Amendment claimant may be entitled to have
the state high court or the Supreme Court conduct an independent
review. In such circumstances, an instance may arise where the state
high court is conducting a factual review even though the intermediate
appellate court did not. However, where a First Amendment claimant
prevails at the trial level but loses on his first appeal, there would
probably not be many, if any, factual findings to be independently
reviewed. This is so because the intermediate appellate court could have
only reversed based upon a legal error apart from any factual
determinations made by the trial court (assuming the intermediate
appellate court did not find clear error). The First Amendment claimant
would be appealing this legal error, and there would likely be few
adverse factual findings made by the trial court—which ruled in favor
of the First Amendment claimant—on which the higher appellate court
would have to pass in order to resolve the legal question before it.
Even if the function of judicial economy would be better served
if the same standard were automatically used throughout the appellate
process, such an interest would have to yield in the face of a “rule of
federal constitutional law.”167 It would likely also serve the interest of
judicial economy to refuse to conduct independent review at all and
merely defer to the trial court’s factual findings. However, in the face of
Bose’s declaration that independent review is constitutionally required
to protect First Amendment liberties,168 no one could seriously contend
that an interest in judicial economy could outweigh a concededly
constitutional rule.
III. INDEPENDENT REVIEW SHOULD ONLY BE USED WHERE A FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIMANT LOSES BELOW
The purposes behind the independent review rule strongly
counsel in favor of applying Bose only when a First Amendment
claimant loses below.169 The language in Bose indicates that Bose’s
purpose and goal of vigorously protecting First Amendment speech
ought to prevail.170 Yet because of broad language in the opinion, some
167
168
169
170

Bose, 466 U.S. at 510.
Id.
See supra notes 152–160 and accompanying text.
Childress, supra note 20, at 1322 (“[I]t should be recognized that the free review rule is
about appealing censorship, not enabling appellate censorship. Thus, the institutional worry about
judicial censorial bodies also includes appellate courts. Their own risks to expression rights are
only exacerbated by providing a review rule that authorizes them to ignore a pro-speech finding.
The enigma is that the independent review rule was designed specifically to protect speakerdefendants in defamation actions, and now it is being used to allow an appellate court to doubt
freely a lower court’s determination protecting defendants. The effect is that defendants winning
below have less protection on appeal than they would if no First Amendment interests were
involved at all. Ultimately, the power can mean that a pro-speech case like Bose would protect the
government in its efforts to stifle speech.”). See also Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380,
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have improperly interpreted it to suggest that Bose should be applied as
a two-way street.171
The purposes behind the Bose rule strongly counsel in favor of
conducting independent review only when the First Amendment
claimant loses below, because applying the rule otherwise would give
the government the benefit of independent review and result in an
underprotection of speech, rather than an overprotection. Thus, the only
argument in favor of applying Bose as a two-way street is to maintain
symmetry in the law.172 This interest in symmetry, however, does not
appear from the Court’s opinion in Bose to be of any meaningful
significance. As discussed above, symmetry is often disregarded where
greater, fundamental constitutional interests, such as First Amendment
rights, are at stake.173
Furthermore, any interest in symmetry here is based on the
notion that symmetrical procedures should prevail regardless of
differences between the parties. The law may generally treat like parties
alike—and strong policy considerations favor such symmetrical and
equal treatment—but parties acting in completely different positions
and pursuing completely different interests need not be treated
symmetrically for the same of symmetry.174
The great importance ascribed to First Amendment speech in
383 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Bose rule “reflects a special solicitude for claims that the
protections afforded by the First Amendment have been unduly abridged, while not affording
special protection for the government’s claim that it has been wrongly prevented from restricting
speech”) (internal punctuation omitted).
171 See supra note 148.
172 See Volokh, supra note 162, at 1027 (“Moreover, a symmetric rule is fairer to plaintiffs.
Harassment plaintiffs’ claims aren’t of constitutional magnitude, but they’re certainly important. I
see no policy reason to treat these plaintiffs worse than defendants, assuming Bose’s requirements
are satisfied.”). Volokh, however, argues that in workplace harassment claims—aside from where
a special verdict is utilized—a jury finding in favor of a defendant generally cannot be subject to
independent review by an appellate court. Volokh explains that, since there are multiple ways in
which a defendant can win, it would be almost impossible for an appellate court to determine on
which ground the jury based its conclusion. Id. at 1028–29.
173 See supra Part II.
174 Childress, supra note 20, at 1322 (“The only justification for the two-way street is a wholly
formal thinking that makes ‘equal process’ apply regardless of the speaker. Yet, if there is any
constitutional principle [Bose] is based on, it is free expression, not equality-to the extent free
speech is inconsistent with the most superficial and formal notions of equality that would force
the same rule on quite different parties.”(emphasis added)). See also id. at 1322–23 (arguing that
courts have mistakenly characterized the issue of actual malice independently reviewed in Bose as
being one of “law”). Childress goes on to argue that, if malice is a question of law, then
symmetrical review should apply, but if it a question of fact, then Bose’s rationale should govern
and Bose should be read as a one-way street. Id. at 1323 (“At bottom, the dilemma mirrors the
general question of Bose’s basis: If malice is ‘legal,’ then de novo review may apply in any case,
but if de novo review applies because of the First Amendment, the symmetrical scrutiny of prospeech findings defies the basic point of the doctrine. All the nebulous talk of mixed-question
analysis appears to have confused the issue to the point of actually empowering appellate courts
to exercise censorial discretion themselves, rather than providing the protection against it that the
Court’s legacy of independent judgment requires.”).
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Bose and Times v. Sullivan by the Bose court demonstrates that Bose’s
fundamental purpose of protecting speech need not be inhibited by a
“superficial and formal notion[] of equality”175 which would require
symmetry for no reason other than to provide symmetry. Reading a
symmetry requirement into Bose’s holding would distort the purpose of
the independent review rule and inhibit free speech claims from
succeeding—a result which would seem to be the antithesis of Bose’s
stated goal of “preserv[ing] the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution.”176 Additionally, Bose suggests a
preference for over-protection of First Amendment freedoms, and where
independent review is applied symmetrically, that preference for overprotection and vigorous defense of First Amendment rights is
substantially frustrated.
Thus, Bose’s rule of independent review should be applied only
where the First Amendment claimant lost below. Bose should be
interpreted as a one-way street in order to further the speaker’s interest
in free speech, provide vigorous protection of First Amendment rights,
and to refuse to further protect the government or a defamation plaintiff
in its claim that speech should be restricted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the driving purpose behind Bose is to further enhance
First Amendment protections, independent review should only be
applied where the First Amendment claimant loses below, and not
where the First Amendment claimant prevails.

175
176

Id. at 1322.
466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984).

